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STUDY PROJECT

LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL RICHARD R. BABBITT
United States Army

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A predictable outcome of the ongoing aspiration for a New World Order is a far smaller military force structure. A smaller force structure driven by changing threats, new required capabilities, and far fewer resources. Concurrently, there is an ongoing review of each service's roles, functions, and missions in pursuit of national military strategy. Joint and service doctrine continues to be revised and updated. New technology still stretches the imagination and impacts on all aspects of the military environment. The ripple effect should be that each service's major force structure pieces, such as the Army's light infantry divisions, will be reviewed. A review process that looks at the linkage between strategic realities, national security policy, national defense strategy, national military strategy, and finally at each service's roles, functions, and missions.

This research paper first reviews the Cold War decision to add light infantry divisions to the Army of Excellence in 1983; and concludes that the decision was derived from a top-down analysis. An analysis that establishes linkage from national defense strategy to an Army requirement for a set of capabilities fulfilled by the light infantry divisions (LIDs). At the end of the Cold War the National Command Authority had at its disposal seven LIDs in the Army force structure.

The second part of the paper, which assumes an understanding of the Bush administration's vision for a New World Order, attempts to answer the thesis question—is there a requirement for light infantry divisions in the New World Order military force structure? This part of the paper looks at the top-down linkage between the new defense strategy foundations, the new military strategy concepts, and the new strategic realities. Included are a bottom-up look at possible New World Order low intensity conflict (LIC) missions for which the LIDs were originally designed; and counter arguments or alternatives to the LIDs.

A current separate issue with the LIDs is their design, which boils down to a division versus brigade based concept. This paper attempts to avoid this controversy and instead deal with LIDs at the requirement level.

The paper concludes that there is a requirement for light infantry division type forces in the Army's force structure. A requirement which can be first couched in terms of national defense strategy foundations and military strategy concepts; and secondly derived from the Army's roles and functions.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Lieutenant Colonel Richard R. Babbitt
United States Army

Colonel Joseph C. Bowen
Project Advisor

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U.S. Army War College
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ABSTRACT

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INTRODUCTION

In the beginning there was only light infantry. There has always been a need for light infantry. There always will be. The thesis developed here is as simple and direct as the light infantry concept itself. As the US Army continues to down-size, while concurrently expanding military missions in a New World Order, the requirement for light infantry forces remains as important today and into the future as first envisioned in 1983.

At the Summer '83 Army Commander's Conference concern was expressed by numerous senior commanders about the growing 'hollowness' within the Army. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) was tasked for a new study addressing this problem to be called The Army of Excellence (AOE). Guidance for the study included reviewing all force structure concepts and designs, and developing a proposal for a light infantry division. At the Fall '83 Army Commander's Conference General John A. Wickham, Jr., then Chief of Staff, United States Army (CSA) approved the design and concept for a new light infantry division (LID).¹ Since 1984, the Total Army force structure has seen the reorganizing or reactivating of seven infantry divisions on the light infantry division model.² Six of these divisions are part of the Active Component and thus represent a significant portion of the Army's current active capability.

The purpose of this paper is not to argue whether the Army has too many light divisions or how many there should be. Even the most die-hard light infantrymen recognizes, but then again they may not, that the number and size of light infantry divisions is decreasing. Nor is there any intent to get into the weeds debating the design of the light infantry division. Although in the conclusions, a postulate will be asserted that the current light infantry division structure could and probable should be redesigned. But before one can get into the force design business, the requirement for having any light infantry divisions in the force structure must be well established. This was the intent of a 1984 Army White Paper addressing light infantry divisions.

In early 1984, General Wickham issued a White Paper entitled Light Infantry Divisions describing the need for and the characteristics, formation, training, equipping, and sustaining of light infantry divisions (LIDs). The White Paper's purpose was to explain to the Army's military and civilian leadership a vision of the future and the renewed need for a well trained and modern Army light infantry force in that future.³

What this research paper does is compare General Wickham's 1983 vision against today's vision for the Army. From these visions flow the requirement for light infantry forces couched in terms of (1) national defense strategy realities, foundations, and concepts; and (2) service roles, functions, and missions. The first part of the paper reviews why light infantry divisions reentered the force structure during the Cold War as part of the Army of Excellence (AOE). Included in this review is a recap of just what light infantry forces have been doing since 1984.

Next the requirement for light infantry forces in the New World Order will be derived from the national defense strategy realities, foundations, and concepts for a New World Order. Included in this portion of the paper will be an expanded discussion of low intensity conflict (LIC) and United Nations sponsored collective security. From LIC and UN collective security agreements will come numerous missions for each of the services to execute and for which this author believes Army light infantry is the best suited force.

Finally, opposing arguments which call for severely curtailing or eliminating Army light infantry forces will be presented. Alternatives to Army LIDs include the US Marine Corps, Army heavy divisions, Reserve Component forces, Special Operations Forces, forces from other nations, and lastly a separate light infantry brigade structure.

Before starting, however, a quick discussion is needed of how some critical terms will be used in this research paper. Far too often points of contention stem solely from different meanings and connotations applied to words supposedly understood by all-- the war of semantics. First is an explanation of roles, functions, and missions in both a service and an Army context; then a discussion of national defense strategy terms.

Roles, functions, and missions for each of the Armed Services is currently a hot topic and with a new Democratic administration in Washington will continue to be a hot topic. Much of this discussion will center upon agreeing to a working definition for roles, missions, and functions. As William W. Epley states in his Roles and Missions of The United States Army, "one year's role may become another year's mission or function....".⁴ For the purposes of this paper roles, missions, and functions will be used in the same nature as defined by General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs:

Roles-- "The broad and enduring purpose for which a Service was established by the Congress in law."⁵

Functions-- "Those more specific responsibilities assigned a Service through Executive action which permit it to successfully fulfill its legally-established role."⁶

Mission-- "Those tasks assigned to a Unified or Specified command by the President or Secretary of Defense."⁷

The Army's two principal roles are (1) to provide land component forces for national defense--repelling invasion, defending the US and its overseas possessions, and defeating any nation responsible for aggressive acts threatening the peace and security of the United States; and (2) to provide forces for internal security-- suppressing insurrection or rebellion and executing the laws of the Union.⁸ Within these two broad Army roles are numerous specific functions given to the Army. The first role requires the Army to train and equip land forces for fighting and winning across the full spectrum of conflict. The second role leads to the Army having the primary service responsibility (function) for providing forces for domestic disturbance, disaster relief, and nation building.

Within the Army, one level removed from the context in which General Powell was defining the terms, there are also roles, functions, and missions for each of the Army's major force structure organizations and Army branches. As an example, the 1984 role of light infantry divisions within an Army context was to provide rapidly deployable Army forces with strategic agility and strategic flexibility. This role in turn satisfies a requirement

generated by the national defense strategy.⁹ Light infantry division functions as outlined in the White Paper are (1) to be able to execute low intensity conflict (LIC) missions worldwide, such as insurgency, counter insurgency, peacekeeping, and contingency operations; and (2) to rapidly reinforce forward deployed forces in NATO and the Far East.¹⁰

National defense strategy terms: The requirement for light infantry divisions should logically flow (1) from US interests or objectives (national ends); (2) through national security policy, which includes agendas (national ways) for international politics or diplomacy; domestic and international economics; national defense; and protection of the environment¹¹; (3) to a national defense and military strategy; which includes service roles, functions, and missions (national military means). Within the national defense and military strategies there are (1) a set of strategic realities called threats, limitations, and restrictions; and (2) sets of strategy "ways" subdivided into strategy foundations and strategy concepts.¹² These strategy realities, foundations, and concepts are neither stand alone or consequential; but are instead interdependent and change as either US interests are reorder or as national security strategy changes. (This paper assumes US interests do not change, but the emphasis or priority may periodically.)

In summary, this paper will argue the continuing requirement for modern light infantry division forces as the United States Army moves into the 21st century and aspires for a New World Order. An argument proposing that while the national security policy agendas and national defense strategy have changed since 1983 they still generate a requirement (capability, utility, and need) for which light infantry divisions are well suited. An argument proposing that the role of light infantry divisions within the Army's role remains essentially the same as it did in 1983. An argument proposing that there will be more and larger missions within the low intensity conflict (LIC) function and new missions within the Army's internal or domestic security role. Missions for which light infantry division forces are again best suited to perform.

COLD WAR LIGHT INFANTRY


"Army leadership is convinced, based on careful examination of studies which postulate the new kind of world in which we will be living and the nature of conflict we can expect to face, that an important need exists for highly trained, rapidly deployable light forces." ¹³ General Wickham's introduction to the Light Infantry Divisions White Paper.

What led the Army leadership to this vision? Could they see beyond the Cold War? No one in 1984 was predicting the near term demise of communism, or the downfall of the Soviet Union, or the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, or the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. Defeating Soviet hordes plunging through places like the Fulda Gap dominated the Army's missions. ¹⁴ Responding to Communist threats elsewhere in the world also presented a growing problem. The requirement for light infantry in the Army force structure was a coming to grips with this challenge rather than any clairvoyant vision into the future.

Key to understanding the light infantry decision is first understanding the dynamics of the early eighties. First and foremost was a Republican administration commitment to strengthening the military. To the Army this translated into more modern equipment, better training, and more force structure. Force structure that not only called for light infantry forces, but more special operations forces (SOF) and echelons above corps (EAC) forces. However, even with greater resources available there is never enough to satisfy every one's presumed needs, justified requirements, and "sacred cows".

Those who saw Central Europe, Southwest Asia, and Korea as the only vital interests areas threaten by conventional warfare argued rightfull so for more modern heavy forces. In competition were those arguing for a new force structure piece specifically designed, equipped, and tailored to confront the numerous communist influenced low intensity conflict (LIC) situations. The new threat in the early eighties was an expected increase of LIC throughout the third world. ¹⁵ Not surprisingly, the compromise position developed was to have modernized heavy divisions, modest increases in SOF and EAC, and several new light divisions--a balanced force. ¹⁶

The argument for light infantry revolved around one chart--the spectrum of conflict chart-- the mother of all charts. Displayed numerous ways the past ten years these charts graphed 'probability of occurrence' versus 'risk to US interest/survival' from terrorism to strategic nuclear conflict (See graph below). Nuclear war while presenting the greatest risk to the US was deemed the least probable event. Terrorism was seen to be the most likely conflict event, but presenting little risk to the survival of the United States.¹⁷ (Note: Continuum in these early charts does not include military operations in 'support of peace').



Based upon its roles and functions and these conflict spectrum charts, the Army's first priority was designing, structuring, training, and forward deploying forces to meet the conventional war threats in Europe and Korea. Next, the Army needed a greater capability to meet the increasing challenge of conflicts short of conventional war. Not surprisingly, the Army's focus and preponderance of resources went to building and maintaining heavy conventional forces. Filling the LIC capability void with LIDs was not automatic regardless of how intuitive. Playing key roles in the final decision were the national defense strategy foundations and concepts of the time; the historical precedence of light infantry; finding utility for light infantry on the mid to high intensity battlefield; and new technology.

The defense strategy foundations throughout the Cold War were nuclear deterrence, containment of communism, and full mobilization. These foundations then imparted the strategy concepts of (1) assured nuclear destruction with the Soviet Union; (2) a large forward presence of heavy forces in Europe and Korea; (3) strategic reserves who were heavy and oriented towards Europe; (4) security assistance to any non-communist country wanting it; (5) and show of force towards LIC. Strategy foundations and concepts flowed from the strategic realities of the early eighties: (1) a bipolar face off with the Soviet Union (survival threat) in Europe (vital interest); (2) a growing menace from communist insurgencies (threats) around the world (some major, but mostly peripheral interest areas); (3) limited strategic airlift and fast sealift (limitation); and (4) a domestic political need to decisively win the first battle quickly or as a minimum to avoid getting mired in another Vietnam (restriction).

Also apparent was that any low-intensity conflict capability was most likely going to come from CONUS bases because the US could not to be everywhere in the world. Therefore, the new LIC capability had to be flexible, versatile, and rapidly deployable--in other words, it needed strategic agility. The LIC force had to be flexible in its design and in its theater training orientation; yet, versatile enough to perform a wide range of LIC missions.¹⁸ To be a credible deterrent and win the first battle upon employment, the LIC capability had to be rapidly deployable by strategic airlift and lethal upon arrival. To make matters worse, with resources directed towards modernization of the heavy forces, these new LIC forces had to be relatively inexpensive.

The combination of strategic realities, strategy foundations and concepts, and the spectrum of conflict dilemma set the stage in the early eighties for breaking the heavy division only paradigm. The door for a light infantry force requirement was pried open. A requirement expressed in terms of capabilities-- strategic flexibility, agility, readiness, and deployability. A requirement also expressed in terms of global versatility (historical precedence and high intensity battlefield utility) and lethality (technology).

The historical precedence of light infantry was not lost during the utility of light infantry argument. Early eighties research went to great lengths documenting a convincing argument that light infantry was an acceptable compliment to heavy forces on the high-intensity battlefield and the force of choice for low-intensity conflict. The best and most thorough research was conducted by Dr. Edward Luttwak. His Historical Analysis and Projection for Army 2000 is the single best document describing American and foreign light infantry type forces. Done under contract for TRADOC in 1983 just prior to the AOE initiatives, this document contains eighteen separate research papers on historical and contemporary "dissimilar" forces. Each paper describes force design, capabilities, limitations, and employment considerations for such diverse "dissimilar" forces as the Swedish Norland Brigades, the Swiss mountain division, the Austrian mountain battalions, the Israeli light brigades, and the US World War II 10th Light (Alpine) Division. In his conclusions, Dr. Luttwak outlines in extensive detail the need for light infantry, when and where to use them, and when and where not to use light infantry.¹⁹

A 1985 follow-up study for TRADOC conducted by Dr. Luttwak entitled Strategic Utility of US Light Divisions, A Systematic Evaluation attempts to bridge the gap between the historical application and the 1983 perceived requirement for light infantry forces. This study develops four possible mission scenarios that light infantry divisions could be called upon to perform. The missions are: (1) defending in a mature theater as either a forward-deployed or reinforcing division; (2) fighting in desert or arid mountain terrain such as found in Southwest Asia; (3) performing LIC missions; and (4) performing roles of rescue, anti-terrorism, or intervention (coup de main). The conclusions here are very much like those in his first study.²⁰

While these studies stilled the disagreement concerning the utility of light forces in low-intensity, contentious arguments revolving around light force utility in Europe and Korea continued. The argument went--Could the US afford to have any of its active component strategic reserves without utility on the mid to high intensity battlefield?

Utility of light infantry forces on the European battlefield commanded numerous articles during the early periods of the light infantry division development and continued throughout the remainder of the Cold War. Military journals and the Army Times are crowded with articles between 1984 and 1986.²¹ An Army Times article entitled "The Division May Be "Light", But Can It Fight?" by Colonel Brudvig contends that the light infantry division would not have the ability to fight on the high-intensity battlefield against the soviets or soviet surrogate forces. He states:

"The main adversary of the United States is the Soviet Union and her surrogates. To be able to fight these forces, which are equipped with modern armor, helicopter and support equipment, one can deduce that light divisions will have a very unfavorable combat power ratio." ²²

Supporting the utility in Europe position were General William E. DePuy, "The Light Infantry Indispensable Element of a Balance Force;" ²³ and LTG John R. Gavin, "Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission."²⁴ Maybe the best, is "Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence," by Captain (P) David Petraeus. Petraeus ties together the strategic flexibility and mobility of LIDs to where and how these forces could be rapidly employed in the European theater. His thesis was that the operational and tactical utility of LIDs combined with their strategic mobility and flexibility added to the overall US defense strategy concept of deterring soviet aggression.²⁵ This in turn enhanced the national defense strategy foundation of containing communism.

In 1988, a more conclusive study examining how light infantry divisions could be employed on the high intensity battlefield of Europe was completed by Colonel (P) Huba Wass de Czege. Tactical, operational, and strategic implications of employing light infantry divisions are addressed. The study's strategic implications are that the early employment of light infantry forces into Europe (1) provides a credible deterrence; (2) would demonstrate nation resolve with a non-offensive capability; and (3) provides operational flexibility and an enhancement to the European theater commander.²⁶

New technology giving light forces the edge in survivability, mobility, communication, and lethality played a key part in General Wickham's light infantry vision.²⁷ Classic Light Infantry and New Technology, a 1982 Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA) study, recommends that some of the Army's force structure could be light infantry given new improvements in technology. Steve L. Canby, the study's author, identifies areas where technology could increase light infantry performance in the High Technology Light Infantry Division (HTLD).²⁸ Scientific and engineering communities were then to focus their research and development efforts towards high-payoff improvements.²⁹

Canby's study also explains the traditional American way of designing and employing light infantry versus the European "classical" philosophy. He describes how classic light infantry could be used in defense of the Zagros Mountains, the defense of Europe, and in the adjunct role for urban and forest warfare. Canby recommends adapting European-style light infantry tactics and organization.³⁰ Although produced with the HTLD in mind, the study provides the transition of thought from Dr. Luttwak's historical perspective of light infantry to General Wickham's vision.

Technology was also at the center of a parallel argument over just what is light infantry -- is it "classic European" or is it the US style? Are light forces light because of their organization and equipment or because of their ethos? Organization and equipment are of course important variables in determining strategic mobility and lethality. The US style simply took regular infantry and remade it smaller and lighter, such as in the 77th Infantry Division (Light) of World War II. Classic light infantry expounds the difference is one of attitude, training, and tactical style. A Perspective On Infantry, by John English³¹ and A Historical Perspective on Light Infantry, by Major Scott R. McMichael³² address these differences. The 1984 Light Infantry Division White Paper in true American compromise attempts to capture the best of both types of infantry in the subsections of the white paper.³³

In summary, what has light infantry been doing since 1984? While the purpose of this paper is not to revisit the merits of the original arguments, what's important is that senior Army leaders were able to convince the Department of Defense (DOD) and Congress of the requirement for LIDs principally upon national defense and military strategy foundations and concepts, and upon prevailing strategic realities.

After documenting the historical precedence of light forces, describing the utility for light forces throughout the conflict spectrum, and demonstrating that light forces were an affordable LIC alternative, a decision was made to build two new light infantry divisions, convert three divisions to LIDs, and model two others on the light infantry concept.³⁴ The Army by 1988 had a credible strategic capability to deter, confront or defeat Communist aggression at the low-intensity end of the conflict spectrum.

Light infantry forces in the form of Rangers, the 82d Airborne Division, and the 7th Infantry Division (Light) performed the lion's share of missions during Just Cause. Forgetting the augment over the necessity for this operation, Just Cause did demonstrate that the US could rapidly deploy a significant lethal force within the Western Hemisphere and accomplish a complex set of tasks quickly, decisively, and professionally.

Between 1986-1989, major elements of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) participated in REFOGER Exercises demonstrating light infantry utility on the European high intensity battlefield and the rapid mobility of strategic reserves. Concurrently in a like manner, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) in Hawaii was sending elements to Korea as part of Team Spirit Exercises as a means of demonstrating deterrence. The first major element deploying to Saudi Arabia after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the 82d Airborne Division. Whether this force deterred Iraq's continued advance South may never be known. Nevertheless, a credible, although highly risky, deterrent was rapidly deployed and employed to halt further Iraqi advances. Additionally, light forces of 18th Airborne Corps, principally the 101st Air Assault Division, provided the fast advancing, far-left security arm during the offensive phase of the Desert Storm campaign plan.

However, nowhere in the early eighties discussions is there mention of using LIDs in support of the Army's other main role-- internal security. This role includes the functions of providing forces for domestic security, enforcing the laws of the Union, disaster relief, and nation building. "... (T) he light divisions never were intended to be used in nonmilitary missions, said retired Gen. John Wickahm, chief of staff when the light divisions were activated."³⁵ Because LIDs are ideally suited for these man power and small equipment intensive missions they have been called upon regularly to perform them during period of natural disasters such as Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew.

Likewise, there was little if any discussion concerning the Army's functions within its national defense role of providing forces overseas for peacekeeping, security assistance, or humanitarian assistance in support of national interests. Hind sight reveals that in all of these functions numerous missions have flowed to light infantry division forces. In the Sinai, a light infantry battalion task force has been peacekeeping since 1982 for the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO). Battalion and company size light infantry forces have continuously been deployed to Honduras since the mid-eighties demonstrating a forward presence deterrence and conducting security assistance at relatively low cost. Additionally, a light infantry task force was deployed to Northern Iraq--Operation Provide Comfort and to Guantanamo Bay--Operation GTMO in order to provide humanitarian services and protection for the Kurds and Haitians, respectively.

The events described above give credence to the strategic utility and successful application of light infantry as envisioned in the 1984 White Paper. The requirement (need, utility, and capability) for light infantry divisions appears to flow smoothly from national security strategy, through national defense and military strategy foundations and concepts, to the Army's roles and functions. Cold War light infantry divisions can point to their force structure requirement and see a linkage between national security strategy and the on the ground missions they were given. The next portion of this paper will examine if this linkage still exists and is still valid in the New World Order.

NEW WORLD ORDER LIGHT INFANTRY

The fall of the Berlin Wall, break-up of the Warsaw Pact, and the collapse of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology came unexpectedly, quickly, and left nearly everyone in a lurch as to what it meant and what to do next. In Aspen, Colorado, on 2 August 1992, President Bush delivered a benchmark speech outlining what the United States should be doing for the remainder of the decade and well into the next century.³⁶ His vision turns the national defense strategy from soviet bloc deterrence and containment (principally in Europe) to a defense strategy of crisis response and protection of US interests by power projection.³⁷

President Bush's New World Order is having far reaching military implications. Being effected are changes to service and joint doctrine, to the Unified Command Plan (UPC), to personnel and budget levels, to force structure changes, and ultimately to force design changes. These changes result from changes in the national security strategy agendas for the economy, defense, diplomacy, and the environment. The New World Order also has a revised set of strategic realities, defense strategy foundations, and military strategy concepts that ultimately effect the requirement for light infantry forces. The Cold War had its set derived from national security strategy as discussed in the previous section.

The New World Order national defense strategy was first outlined in the August 1991 National Security Strategy of the United States which listed five fundamental demands or foundations--nuclear deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, reconstitution, and a smaller, restructured force.³⁸ Some of the current literature refers to only four foundations by eliminating 'a smaller, restructured force'. The January 1993 National Security Strategy of the United States list four fundamental elements or foundations--strategic nuclear deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.³⁹

Underpinning military strategy concepts flowing from these five foundations are excellently discussed in "New Directions in US Military Strategy" by General James P. McCarthy and in the January 1992 report National Military Strategy of the United States. McCarthy's underlying strategy concepts are (1) readiness, (2) collective security, (3) arms control, (4) security assistance, (5) maritime and aerospace superiority, (6) power projection, (7) decisive force and strategic agility, and (8) technological superiority.⁴⁰ The National Military Strategy of the United States outlines a similar set of strategy principles: (1) readiness, (2) collective security, (3) arms control, (4) maritime and aerospace superiority, (5) strategic agility, (6) power projection, (7) technological superiority, and (8) decisive force.⁴¹ As an example, power projection is one of the "ways" for preserving and promoting fundamental democratic values, political and economic freedoms, and individual and human rights throughout the world.

The new set of national defense strategic realities, which act as a counter weight to the national defense strategy foundations and concepts, looks much like the Cold War set of realities. First, there remains a shortage of strategic airlift and fast sealift just as there was in the early eighties. Secondly, our New World Order economic, humanitarian, and defense interests are scattered throughout the world, much like the Cold War era threats of communism were scattered throughout the world. Thirdly, resources to provide all the desired power projection capability simply will not happen because of the deficit-ridden domestic economy.

The military requirement, resulting in part from these strategic realities, to rapidly project power with strategic agility anywhere in the world, to employ those forces with the minimum of risk, and to win decisively-- all while consuming the minimum amount of national resources, once again, drives the military force structure towards light and lethal infantry forces. The New World Order impact on the Army has been laid out by both the former and current Chiefs of Staff, Army: General Vuono and General Sullivan.

In "National Strategy and the Army of the 1990's" General Vuono describes his vision for the Army; the elements of the national defense strategy for which the Army must have a capability; and the imperatives upon which to reshape, train, and maintain the Army. He concludes the Army, while reshaping its size and disposition, "with fewer forces and a more pronounced focus on power projection," still must be an Army of continuity of capabilities.⁴² One of his imperatives calls for, "Maintain (ing) a mix of forces--armored, light, and special operations--that gives us the capacity to tailor force packages appropriate to the challenges we confront."⁴³ In an earlier Foreign Affairs article entitled "Desert Storm and the Future of Conventional Forces," General Vuono makes a similar case that a credible deterrent and fighting conventional capability across the entire spectrum of conflict must be preserved.⁴⁴

General Sullivan is continuing General Vuono's same theme that the Army needs to be capabilities-based rather than threat-based.⁴⁵ Sullivan's focus is upon maintaining a flexible, lethal, expandable set of combined arms capabilities (heavy, light, and SOF) across the entire spectrum or continuum of conflict and military operations.⁴⁶ The requirement for Army light infantry divisions results from this top-down analysis of the New World Order national defense strategy. This analysis assumes minimal change in each service's roles, functions, and missions.

However, aspiring for a New World Order is certain to impact on the military's role in implementing national security policy and on each armed service's roles, functions, and missions. The extent and significance of these changes, which began in the Bush administration, will be played out under President Clinton. Debates concerning the direction, extent, and pace of these changes are ongoing in all forums, particularly in the Congress and in current military literature. These debates are far different than those of the early eighties, when there was a universally recognized survival threat in the Soviet Union.

The essential difference in the debate today is to what extent (when, where, why, and how) will the US exercise its superpower in world events. Will the US become

interventionist, isolationist, or pragmatic in the execution of its national security strategy? Some indications may be gleamed from the current US involvement in Iraq and Somalia, and the lack of direct involvement in Bosnia and Haiti. President Bush's speeches at West Point and Texas A&M indicate he would have followed a pragmatic approach in using military power. Congressman Les Aspin, now Secretary of Defense Aspin, on numerous occasions has expressed a more aggressive use of a "limited objectives" approach. The anticipation is that President Clinton will increase military missions across the entire spectrum of military operations involving all the services. Missions which Aspin's says call for a lighter, smaller, faster force with versatility and a technological edge.⁴⁷

The second difference today concerns service roles, functions, and missions. These were not at issue during the Cold War. They will most likely be worked out during the first two years of the new Democratic administration, specifically by General Powell, Secretary of Defense Aspin, and Senator Nunn. Much of this new debate concerns itself with obtaining cost-cutting efficiencies, such as consolidating depot maintenance, logistic systems, basic training, and such common services as legal, chaplaincy, and medical. Quick, although painful, accommodation will occur with this portion of the debate.

However, whose function it is to conduct expeditionary and contingency missions is potentially service threatening. Like the Cold War, the expected and most probable threats once again fall within the definition of LIC, which includes expeditionary and contingency operations. From the new defense strategy foundations and concepts will flow both inter and intra-service debates over who has the requirement to perform these missions. The Marine Corps and Army are sparring for both sets of missions. Within an Army context the requirement (need, utility, and capability) for LIDs will once again be a part of this new debate. This is the conflict continuum for which LIDs were designed.

The next section will review LIC in the New World Order and the missions that light infantry divisions could expect to perform in each of the four doctrinal LIC categories and in an added category called United Nations regional collective security.

MORE MISSIONS IN LIC

The working definition of low intensity conflict (LIC) found in Army Field Manual 100-20 is below. Despite the misleading connotation of low intensity, this portion of the conflict continuum is where the United States has for the past fifty years spent a great deal of effort and will for the foreseeable future spend most of its Department of Defense efforts and resources. This is also the portion of the conflict continuum for which light infantry divisions were designed and for which their operational concept addresses. Whereas the previous sections of this paper looked at a top-down analysis of the LIC requirement, this section looks at the bottom--where the missions and tasks will come from.

"Low intensity conflict (LIC) is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above routine, peaceful competition among states." "The four LIC operational categories are -- support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; combating terrorism; peacekeeping operations; and peacetime contingency operations." "LIC is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military instruments." 48

Besides LIC's confusing connotation, the myriad situations and scenarios included under this portion of the conflict continuum seem endless. The broad LIC definition includes military operations (missions, activities, responses, tasks, actions) that occur during periods of conflict short of war (crisis) and during conventional war. Unfortunately, many of the missions described under the LIC category of contingency operations are most likely to occur during times of peace or promoting peace.

A better way to describe the expected New World Order LIC operations is to adapt the "continuum of military operations" put forth by LTC Edward E. Thurman in "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis, and War."⁴⁹ He proposes updating the "mother of all slides" in order to capture the concept of promoting peace. In between promoting peace and fighting conventional war is a continuum concept called deterring war, which is akin to the traditional definition of low intensity conflict above.

The demise of communism and of the former Soviet Union are two extraordinary events that have significantly redefined and reordered US national interests. Changing economic concerns and diplomatic alliances have also contributed to a reordering of US national interests. The definition or description of national interest does not really matter. If US military forces, talent, or resources are employed, then our civilian leadership have decided the situation in question is a threat of some degree to some US national interest.

The word, threat, connoting images of powerful military forces with clearly understood orders of battle, may be the wrong word to use these days. Threat as used here denotes any situation, which will elicit a US military response or commitment of military resources. Somali's "Operation Provide Hope" is an excellent example of breaking the old stereo type of threat and of national interest. Similar humanitarian situations throughout the world, such as in Madagascar, Haiti, Sudan, and Bosnia, are threats in the sense US military resources are likely to be used there also.

In the very broadest sense a military activity of any kind is first initiated by a threat to a national interest. This is a much broader definition of both threat and interest. However, the purpose of this paper is not to challenge the entangled LIC definition or its scope. As it relates to the thesis of this paper, given a broader definition of both threat and of national interest, the US military will significantly increase its missions in two of the LIC categories, in LIC overall, and in a related and added category called United Nations (UN) regional collective security arrangements.

This section will crystal ball future threats to our national interests which would then trigger US military responses in each of the four LIC operational categories and UN collective security. The questions are not that these missions exist or that the military is going to do them; but rather who within the military force structure has the requirement and is best capable of performing them. This paper contends that Army light infantry divisions are best suited for many of the widely different low intensity conflict missions.

US support for insurgency or counterinsurgency is on a steep decline. This is not to say that insurgencies are on the decline. They may even be on the rise. As a nation, the US looks at this category of LIC fundamentally different than the other three. Even if a clearly defined connection between a threatening insurgency and a major interest could be drawn, there is little likelihood of conventional US troops being committed. The US simply will not become involved in this LIC category, because of its protracted Vietnam experience and its decisive victory expectations resulting from Desert Storm.

With the Russian bear in hibernation, numerous ethnic, cultural, racial, historical, and religious jackals have come out of their dens. But none appear to threaten vital or major US interests. None will lead to any significant US military involvement while the insurgent situation remains at the low end of the conflict continuum. Even Islamic fundamentalism, which poses a threat to the Suez canal and to the Persian Gulf flow of oil, will not draw a classic counterinsurgency response from the United States. Every economic and diplomatic alternative will be exhausted before US troops are committed.

Counterinsurgencies and insurgencies are too long, too costly, too ill-defined, and therefore too politically sensitive. The US has no stomach for this LIC category. The LIC continuum will be bypassed in favor of a decisive conventional war victory. Without renewed political will and risk taking (interest) there are no new threats in this LIC category. LIDs, which are well suited and trained at the Joint Readiness Training Center for missions in this LIC category, can not expect to see future missions in this area.

Terrorism has been a threat for nearly twenty five years. The war against conventional terrorism (sabotage, bombing, hijacking, and killings) being carried out primarily by other government agencies will go on unabated long into the next century. A new kind of terrorism that just might elicit an increase in LIC military responses is the threat from mass destruction weapons--nuclear, biological, and chemical. In the wrong hands these weapons pose a threat to US survival. The problems are proliferation, smaller and more powerful weapons, and an increased availability of long range delivery systems.

In Iraq today, UN inspectors are currently looking to destroy by peaceful means weapons of mass destruction. Lack of cooperation by Iraq carries with it the possibility of these weapons being destroyed by US air power. Air power is not being used in a conventional war sense like Desert Shield/Storm, but rather used in limited LIC direct action strikes against specific targets using precision munitions. Strikes carried out by the UN Gulf coalition using Tomahawk missiles on 13 January 1993 will become common.

Military forces from most major world powers, including the US, are prepared to respond to terrorist situations that are beyond the reach and scope of their civilian agencies. Libya understands what it means to be reached out and touched by the US Air Force when caught sponsoring terrorism. Iraq, Syria, and Iran currently seem to understand this cause and effect equation as well. However, these Mid-East countries also have short memories. Someone will test the new administration in the not so distant future-- and someone may already have in the bombing of the World Trade Towers. The US will likely respond militarily in a LIC context (direct action) against the perpetrators of the terrorism.

Continued proliferation of mass destruction weapons into the unstable hands of the Middle East and central CIS states brings with it a corresponding proliferation of potential terrorist threats. No one should be surprised if someone other than Israel tries destroying these weapons with military means short of conventional war. Special Operation Forces (SOF), which includes the Ranger Regiment, could play heavily in this type of LIC operation. However, conventional Army LID forces and the Marine Corps, while having the capability and training to perform direct action missions, are not the units of choice; and they can expect few if any missions in the LIC category of counter terrorism.

Contingency Operations include a wide array of ten possible missions: disaster relief; shows of force; noncombatant evacuation (NEO); recovery; attacks and raids (direct action); freedom of navigation and protection of shipping; security assistance surges; operations to restore order; DOD support to counter drug operations; and support to US civil authorities.⁵⁰ The most important right now are--counter drugs, disaster relief,

restoring order; and support to civil authorities. These four subcategories of contingency missions can have a domestic or international context and can include both government and non government organizations (NGOs).

1992 broke all previous paradigms that held the US military in reserve as a last resort back-up to other government agencies. Just look at the clamor after hurricane Andrew. Most people do not understand why the active component of the US military was not immediately on station in Dade county. Forget 'posse comitatus'. Wait for the frenzy from humanitarians, liberals, and interventionists if the mission in Somalia is anywhere near successful. Call the US interests in Somalia humanitarian or New World Order leadership, again it does not matter. Threats from these so-called interests abound and are still being invented.

The military is about to enter the nation building business or nation assistance in a big-time way both home and abroad. Many feel that nation assistance missions are a cost-effective compliment to the military's role of deterrence and readiness to fight.⁵¹ The LIC crystal ball displays lots of brooms, rakes, saws and hammers. That's why they call them pioneer tools. The military services have the equipment, the logistical know-how, the personnel, and a spirit of getting things done without partisan grid-lock. The National Guard will walk point on numerous new ideas for state and local community projects. The Active Component will be drawn into similar projects soon enough-- provided it can fix the world's problems first.

New interest and threats in this LIC category are endless. The New World Order's cavalry for contingency operations will be the US military. The Marine Corps will become the new international SWAT team. Light infantry divisions will become the new Peace Corps--policeman, social workers and repairman.

Peacekeeping is the newest growth industry for the US military. Include in this category are (1) supervision of free territories, cease-fires, withdrawals, disengagements, prisoner of war exchanges, demilitarization, and demobilization; and (2) maintenance of law and order.⁵² US involvement for the most part in the past has been limited to command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I); technology; and military transportation. Any US combatant troop involvement will be a tough and unpopular decision, because most peacekeeping situations do not involve vital or major US interests and place US forces in harms way for long periods of time. Nevertheless, other situations (threats or opportunities) like Somalia, Sinai, and Bosnia are everywhere. Although US interests are less than major in these areas, the US military response will be significant.

When peacekeeping forces are required, the best suited and trained appear to be US Army light infantry division forces. These missions usually call for a long-term commitment of lightly-armed, well disciplined soldiers rather than a heavily-armed expeditionary force. Peacekeeping also requires soldiers who know how to protect themselves in small units tasks (fight if necessary), but do not exhibit an offensive capability that would endanger the peace process.

Collective Security looks like peacemaking followed by peacekeeping or peacekeeping prepared to escalate to peacemaking. Collective security sponsored by the United Nations appears after 40 years to be more real than rhetoric. Until the recent Gulf conflict, serious matters of state were settled unilaterally for the most part rather than in concert with the UN. The Cold War pitting the US versus the Soviet Union in an ideological bipolar struggle dead-locked the ability of the UN Security Council to act. While the UN has been used as a forum to expose views, opinions, and to even explain national policy and national will, it seldom provided the consensus to resolve conflicts. The ways, means, and ends for dealing with difficult problems were not within the grasp of the security council or general assembly.

Operation Desert Shield/Storm provides the first real incident in which collective security actions (ways, means, and ends) appears to have been exercised as the founders of the UN envisioned. Prime Minister Jozsef Antall of Hungary stated, "We look upon the experience of that war as both a milestone and a precedent in respect to the conflict management possibilities and involvement of the United Nations."⁵³

A review of President Bush's national security strategy indicates quite emphatically that his administration was comfortable using the United Nations in an expanded role to protect US fundamental values and interests. He saw the United Nations (1) continuing its 40 year old role of improving the human condition and alleviating human suffering; and (2) playing a constructive peacekeeping and peacemaking role, in such conflict riddle places as Afghanistan, Cambodia, the Western Sahara, and Central America.⁵⁴

Russett and Sutterlin argue in their Foreign Affairs article, "The UN in a New World Order", that despite the UN's historical record on peacekeeping policies the time is ripe for the Security Council to exercise its authority "to maintain or restore international peace and security."⁵⁵ First they envision peacemaking and peacekeeping forces being pulled from the many nations who have agreed to consider sending forces to perform these missions. Secondly, forces and/or financing for these forces would come from nations who stand to gain from a settlement of a particular problem. Finally, they see countries like Japan, Germany, Russia, China and others promoting and protecting their overseas interests using the United Nations as "sheep's clothing."

Charles Krauthammer in "The Unipolar Moment" argues that the US for the next several decades will be the only real superpower, because it is the only country that can bring to bear military, political, diplomatic, and economical power. Consequently, he favors the US acting unilaterally wherever and whenever its interests (any interest) are concerned. American political leaders he contends mistakenly make sure to dress unilateral action in multilateral clothing in order to play to American domestic reasons. He argues the US need not and should not disguise its foreign policy ways and means.⁵⁶

On three occasions in the past eighteen months, President Bush has addressed the United Nations. Each time US commitment to a UN collective security concept has been more firmly and clearly restated. On 21 September 1992, he offered American military resources to train peacekeeping forces here in the United States; and proposed a UN quick-response prevention peacekeeping force.⁵⁷ President Bush saw the United States increasingly in "hybrid coalitions" where US interests are congruent with nations not tied to the US in formal treaties.⁵⁸ This may include traditional allies or even nations in which the US does not have a mature history of diplomatic or military cooperation.⁵⁹ Indications are that President Clinton likewise intends to make extensive use of the UN.

A record number of world leaders addressed the 1991 UN Annual General Debate, including 24 Heads of State, 10 Prime Ministers, 10 Deputy Prime Ministers, and 94 Foreign Ministers. An underlining theme of each speaker was a commitment to strengthen the role of the UN in the post-Cold War order, to include finding new collective security arrangements. These new arrangements took shape in the first-ever UN Security Council Summit Meeting, January 31, 1992. "The (this) event was called the highest-level UN conference since the opening session of the General Assembly in 1960."⁶⁰

Out of this high level summit, 15 leaders ratified a non-binding document pledging to the principle of collective security. British Prime Minister John Major in his speech provided the essence of the meeting, "We should reaffirm our attachment to the principle of collective security and to the resolution of disputes. We should send a clear signal that it is through the UN and its Security Council that we intend to deal with threats to international peace and security."⁶¹ Meanwhile French President Mitterand provided an indication of things (means and ways) to come. He offered to provide the Security Council with 1,000 troops for peacekeeping duties within 48 hours, to double that number within one week, and called for a revitalization of the UN Military Staff Committee.⁶²

Shortly afterwards in February 1992, the United Nations Security Council approved the two largest and complex peacekeeping operations in UN history. These were the 22,000-man force to Cambodia and the 14,000-man force to Yugoslavia. While it is far too early to predict success or failure of these operations, the concept of collective security is finally being tested with approval of all the major powers.

In summary, the United Nations is a perfect caldron for mixing, melting, and measuring foreign policy when and where interests are peripheral, major or vital, but not necessarily tied to survival. Likewise, it appears to be the best forum and instrument to manage ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, and nationalistic problems where no solution (ends) appear evident or possible, other than to maintain the status quo. The current world disorder of volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity plays well for a more involved and expanding United Nations

Regardless of how you envision the post-Cold War world, countries will find that they are not only capable of, but eager to create a collective security system regardless of how ad-hoc or short-lived using the UN as their surrogate voice piece and instrument of power. The United Nations is an ideal foreign policy instrument for the United States during this New World Order developmental period as it democratically wanders in search of pragmatism, idealism, isolationism, futurism, interventionism or some other identity.

The UN, which is a major US interest, will be getting more mature and bolder with its collective security concept. Nearly every nation has been bought into the United Nations' concept. Every UN peacekeeping opportunity poses an opportunity (threat) for the United States becoming involved. Light infantry division forces, which are ideally suited for these type missions, could see continuous deployments around the globe in support of UN regional collective security. In this role, light infantry division forces satisfy the national defense strategy concepts of forward presence, collective security, security assistance, technological superiority, and decisive force.

LIC CONCLUSIONS

Two corollaries should be readily evident. First the US will have a capable, smaller military. Secondly, there is an emerging civilian leadership, both in and out of government, which will not allow the majority of its military forces to just standby being ready and trained to fight the next big war. Forget past notions of what constituted good training and readiness. New World Order threats are all the interventionist "good ideas" that the new administration's civilian leadership can dream up for using their military. The vast majority of these good idea missions are LIC activities or peacetime engagements.⁶³ All will be in the national interest. All fall into the operational continuum for which light infantry divisions were originally envisioned and designed.

Army light infantry divisions are the capability of choice, because of their manpower intensive structure, strategic deployability, and equipment compatibility. The majority of LIC missions are manpower intensive, particularly those dealing with disaster relief, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. Although ground transportation is a premium, what is not needed are the heavy offensive assets found in the heavy divisions. Thus there is a cost effective linkage when deploying light infantry to LIC situations, because light infantry forces take the majority of their organic equipment with them.

Likewise the majority of LIC missions require a rapid response, if not an immediate response. The essence of low intensity conflict doctrine is decentralized, light infantry forces applying a wide variety of flexible means in order to influence the outcome of a given situation in coordination with the other instruments of national power.⁶⁴ Deploying rapidly to anywhere in the world is part of every light infantry division's mission essential task list (METL).

SUBSTITUTES FOR ARMY LIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS

If not US Army light infantry divisions, then who? There are seven alternatives to the Army's light infantry divisions: (1) let the Marines do the LIC missions; (2) draw the manpower from the heavy divisions; (3) let the special operations forces (SOF) perform all LIC missions; (4) call up the reserves and National Guard; (5) count upon other nations from regional collective security arrangements or ad hoc coalitions to provide the needed light infantry manpower; (6) replace the LIDs with a separate light infantry brigade structure; and (7) finally, there is always the pragmatic solution which on a mission by mission basis uses some combination of the first six alternatives.

The US Marine Corps is the most popular alternative to Army LIDs. The Department of the Navy presents the most attractive, if not the most convincing arguments, for using the Marines as a substitute for Army light infantry. In its "From The Sea" concept the Navy targets all the right or currently "political correct" buzz words. First is the notion that the Marines and Navy are somehow new full partners in joint operations.⁶⁵

Secondly, and most important is the Navy's and USMC's ability to provide forward presence and power projection. This ability is an attractive "two for one deal". Everyday, somewhere in the world, sailors and marines are providing the National Command Authority with forward presence and power projection as a natural consequence of their routine mission of defending sea lines of communication (SLOC). Add to this the Navy's concepts of "Littoral Region" and 650 nautical mile striking range, then there are very few places in the world the Navy-USMC team can not go.⁶⁶

Additionally, Marines bring to the National Command Authority not only strategic agility but strategic flexibility through their ability to tailor forces using the Marine Air Group Task Force (MAGTF) concept. Included in the MAGTF concept is the notion of "Expeditionary Force Packages," which the Navy has taken the liberty and initiative of capturing as well. The Navy's concept of Expeditionary Force packaging brings in the full

array of other military service capabilities operating under a Navy or USMC JTF Commander.⁶⁷ Built into the MAGTF concept is an already afloat sustainment package, although admittedly somewhat limited in duration and scope.

The expeditionary force concept implies images of a "limited commitment" to accomplish "limited objectives," which is consistent with Secretary Aspin's views.⁶⁸ The US domestic political needs for getting-in quickly and winning decisively are satisfied using an expeditionary force concept. On the other hand, employment of Army light infantry divisions, rightly or wrongly, implies a long-term United States commitment. With any long-term commitment comes the political baggage of cost, casualties, conflict termination time tables, mission success criteria, and the possibility of eroding public and Congressional support. Somalia is a case in point.

In summary, the "From The Sea" concept appears to provide a cavalry capability with a surgeon's finesse. The marines are light, yet lethal, enough to deter conflict in their forward presence role and to win decisively if employed in a power projection role.

Heavy divisions are an enormous pool of manpower which could be tapped to perform LIC missions, assuming they stay in the Active component. Performing LIC missions would give these units something to do while they train and wait for the next big, high-intensity conflict. This option is another attractive "two for one" deal, especially when a high-intensity conflict is a least probable event on the conflict continuum.

The disadvantages of using heavy forces are the incompatibility of equipment and the cost to training readiness. Imagine the degradation in training if heavy battalions were sent to the Sinai to perform the six-month rotation, Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission with its prohibition against bringing any heavy offensive equipment or to Somalia for an indefinite period; or to Guantanamo, without any of their heavy equipment. Recapturing readiness for these types of units would take upwards of a year. The current rule of thumb for the Sinai mission is six months to get ready, six months performing the mission, and six months to recapture unit readiness.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) already perform many of the LIC missions. The entire SOF psyche concerns itself with forward presence, strategic agility, flexibility, and global missions. SOF already brings to the NCA the entire continuum of military operations from promoting peace to fighting war. Jointness is now an integral part of all SOF operations. The only thing that SOF does not routinely concern itself with is large scale, long-term commitments requiring significant sustainment. For long duration sustainment SOF relies on either an Army or Navy/USMC component for support.

The Reserve Components (RC) represent the greatest source of United States manpower, equipment, and expertise for performing nearly all of the LIC missions. In cases involving large-scale or long-duration missions, the likelihood of RC units participating increases because much of the required combat service support, civil affairs, and psychological operations capabilities only exist in the reserve components.

A RC combat battalion task force could perform any of the recurring or follow-on peacekeeping, humanitarian, and nation-building missions. As an example, if there is to be an extended requirement for an infantry task force to stay in Somalia, then why not prepare the 27th Brigade, New York National Guard. This 10th Mtn Division round-out brigade could relieve its sister brigade in the 10th Mountain Division, but probably will not.

Remember, Somalia was to be a short mission without rotation or follow-on. Suggesting that the 27th Brigade start preparing for a rotation last December would have surely killed the entire mission. With a lot of political will and some training, the 27th Bde could have been ready by June; and perform as well as most East African units.

The leap from asking for reserve component volunteers to a Presidential call-up of entire units is a difficult political step. However, this is a step both necessary and hopefully just over the horizon, regardless of future force structure decisions. If the US is to become more interventionist in nation-building and humanitarian activities, the reserve components may be both an inexpensive alternative and the only alternative that either retains or kills public support for such costly and lengthy operations.

Using foreign light infantry forces offers lots of possibilities and lots of challenges. Forging regional collective security arrangements and/or ad hoc security coalitions appears in every national security strategy. Under this concept, the US would bring to these agreements expertise in the form of C3I, technology, naval forces, and firepower from US air and heavy divisions. The other nations would bring the one component which they usually have plenty of and can only afford-- their light infantry forces and light infantry equipment.

There is a risk relying on forces from some developing countries because of their suspect training, leadership, and experience. However, light forces from many developed nations, such as France, Great Britain, and Belgium are highly trained, disciplined, and ready to deploy. The French "Force d'Action Rapide" (FAR) is an excellent example of a multi-dimensional force capable of rapidly deploying and able to deal with the entire continuum of conflict.⁶⁹ Other nations such as Canada, Fiji, and Columbia have light infantry battalions with a wealth of LIC experience, especially peacekeeping.

While offering attractive potential solutions to the expensive US manpower problem, these security arrangements come with their own difficulties. They are extremely hard to forge once a conflict begins, as evidenced today in Bosnia. As Somalia is demonstrating there is also considerable time, effort, and cost training these foreign light infantry forces for the missions they will be expected to accomplish when US forces depart. However, the symbolism of incorporating foreign forces can not be underestimated. This symbolism leads to long-term US political support (leadership, technology, and logistical support) and reduced US human costs.

Separate light infantry brigades are an Army alternative to the LIDs, if the need is to eliminate force structure while keeping a light infantry capability. This solution assumes that the Army has a requirement to retain and maintain some light infantry capability to perform the LIC missions discussed earlier. This alternative is attractive and has merit, when analyzing at the size force normally deployed to LIC situations.

Most often these operation call for battalion task force deployments, with the remainder being brigade task forces. Rarely is there a full division deployment.

This alternative would require breaking the current division-based paradigm. Separate light infantry brigades would need to be designed with greater robustness and redundancy than the light infantry brigades currently have now. The advantages of the LID now are that it (1) provides a supportive base from which to send out tailored battalion and brigade task forces, much like the MAGTF concept, and (2) provides an intact Army Force (ARFOR) Component Command headquarters should one be needed. As LIC operations become more complex and lengthy, such as Operation Provide Hope in Somalia, the need for a division two-star equivalent commander and headquarters will likely become routine. The LID headquarters can deploy with some or all of its units.

The pragmatic solution is that on a mission by mission basis the National Command Authority will call upon all of the above alternatives, including an Army light infantry division capability to accomplish a particular set of tasks. Each LIC situation will invariably be different in terms of immediacy, duration, and complexity and thus requires a different mix of each service's current capabilities.

Somali offers an excellent look at the future. Marines went in first because of their off-shore, standing-by expeditionary capability. They were followed by an Army light infantry division task force, with a mix of SOF units and Reserve Component volunteers. These Army forces are prepared to stay for as long as is required. Finally, there will be a hand-off to light forces from other nations, who could not pull off the expeditionary aspects of the mission or the overwhelming force require to stabilize the situation.

In summary, there are seven viable alternatives to the Army's LIDs. Substituting the Marine Corps and/or designing separate light infantry brigades are the only options that retain a similar set of LID capabilities for the US National Command Authority. The other options forego the US NCA having a light infantry division capability by using a surrogate.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper attempts to answer the question--is there a requirement for light infantry divisions in the post-cold war Army force structure? All too often the answer to force structure questions are answered from a parochial view point. A parochial view point founded in limited experience, self preservation, or lack of vision. Requirements for any major force structure piece should have their origin in national security strategy. Then there should be a logically flow through the wickets of national defense strategy, national military strategy, and service roles and functions. In other words, a major force structure piece, such as the Army's light infantry divisions, should be able (1) to couch its requirement in terms of the prevailing strategic realities, defense strategy foundations, and military strategy concepts; and (2) to fulfill one or more of the Army's functions.

All too often the analysis and argument for a particular force structure piece begins from the bottom-up rather than the top-down. In other words, the justification game is to find missions and functions matching a set of requirement capabilities. Keeping LIDs in the force structure would be relative simple if all that had to be explained was that there are plenty of LIC missions to be performed for which light infantry is well suited.

While a bottom-up analysis is useful, it does not answer the central question. As the section on counter arguments to light infantry divisions demonstrates, there are seven very viable alternatives to light infantry divisions. These alternatives are viable from a bottoms-up analysis, but are less attractive from a top-down analysis. All the alternatives could, in most cases, accomplish the myriad missions (requirement) for which light infantry divisions were designed. However, as the counter argument section highlights, these alternatives do not have a clean, logical linkage back through the service roles and functions to national defense strategy.

Light infantry's introduction during the Cold War as part of the Army of Excellence was the result of a top-down analysis. An analysis determining the Army did not have the capability to effectively deal with the communist influenced LIC threat for which the Army

had a function (requirement). The design and operational concept for the light infantry divisions reflected the strategic realities of the early eighties and the Cold War military strategy foundations and concepts. LIDs brought to the National Command Authority a capability with strategic agility, deployability, and flexibility that could be employed across the spectrum of conflict, anywhere in the world. A capability that on the one hand was relatively inexpensive and non-offensive in nature; yet which provided a source of strategic deterrence, crisis response, and national resolve when deployed in harms way. As the US aspires for a New World Order, none of the capabilities of the LIDs have changed. The NCA still has the original capabilities at its disposal; but are they still required? What has and what has not changed with the struggle for a New World Order?

Clearly the major threat of the Soviet Union attacking in Europe has gone away. The LIDs while having utility in a NATO-Soviet confrontation were never the major player. However, the Cold War 'economy of force' and 'show of force' missions intended for the light infantry divisions explained in Col (P) Was de Czega's study may prove to be even more valid as US forward presence is downsized in Europe. If US NATO ground forces drop too low the utility of CONUS based light infantry in the role of 'power projection' to meet crisis responses in Europe is greatly increased.

LIC is an area with major changes in one sense, but little change in the net effect upon force structure requirements. Communist influenced LIC missions have all but disappeared; however, they have been replaced by more numerous and complex LIC situations caused by racial, cultural, religious, and ethnic differences. If the definition of LIC is expanded to include military operations promoting peace then the number of LIC missions goes up dramatically. Add also to LIC the possibility of UN collective security missions and again the number of LIC missions increases.

One could argue that these LIC missions have always been there, but they were not as important or as in demand in the Cold War as they are today. This is a circuitous argument. How one enters this debate make little difference--the result is the same.

LIC missions by any definition are expanding simply because they are at the heart of the New World Order's problems, opportunities, and challenges.

The roles, functions, and missions of the military services will change. Of necessity the Cold War required all the services, including the Army, to focus on the role of defending the US and its vital interests. The role of internal security was placed on a back burner and left principally to the National Guard to perform. This author predicts that most of the roles, functions, and mission changes will be in the form of efficiencies to cut costs, such as combining related or like training, logistical, communications activities. Each service, however, will retain nearly all of their current war fighting roles and functions--and the corresponding war fighting capabilities. Because of the sickening economy and the reduced Soviet threat each service will retain less of the same capabilities. This will in turn spread missions, particularly LIC missions, between each of the services and prompt missions to be accomplished 'jointly'.

The force structure requirements (need, utility, and capability) for accomplishing the myriad New World Order LIC missions essential mirrors the Cold War LIC requirement. The strategic realities of limited national resources, limited strategic lift, global US interests, and a political need to get in quickly and win decisively still exist.

Cold War defense strategy foundations of global containment and deterrence have been replaced by the New World Order strategy foundations of limited forward presence and crisis response. Here the net effect upon the requirement for a light, deployable, versatile, flexible, and lethal force structure piece is a wash.

The Cold War military strategy concepts of forward presence, strategic reserves, security assistance, and show of force have been replaced by the New World Order strategy concepts of power projection, collective security, security assistance, decisive force, and strategic agility. The net effect here is a requirement for a greater predominance of the military force structure having the capabilities of light infantry divisions.

END NOTES

¹ US Army Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA), Force Design Directorate (FDD), Field Circular: FC 100-1. The Army Of Excellence (Ft Leavenworth, KS: FDD, CACDA, 1 Sep 84), 1-3.

² The seven divisions referred to here are the Active Component 6th Inf. Div.(LT), 7th Inf. Div.(LT), 10th Mountain Div. (LT), 25th Inf Div (LT), 82d Airborne Div., and 101st Air Assault Div; and the Reserve component 29th Inf. Div. (LT).

³ General John A. Wickham, Jr.,(CSA), White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Division (Washington, DC.: Office of the CSA, 16 April 1984), i-ii.

⁴ William W. Epley, Roles and Missions of the United States Army (Washington, DC.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1991), 6.

⁵ Ibid., 6. The quotes are taken from DOD Directive 5100.1, "Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces," At the time of Epley's writing the directive had not been approved. Since then General Colin L. Powell (CJSC) has submitted his Report on the Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, 10 February 1993. A discussion is found on page iv.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid., 16-18.

⁹ Wickham, White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Division, 1.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ President George Bush, preface to National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC.: Govt. Printing Office, August 1991), p. iii-iv. The political, economic, and defense agendas are outlined. I have extracted the environment from the economic agenda because of its increasing importance and the emphasis placed upon it by President Clinton.

¹² This paper will use the terms strategic realities, strategy fundamentals, and strategy concepts throughout. These terms are not used consistently as one reads through official documents and publications. The terms "realities" and "foundations" are used in National Military Strategy of the United States, 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment, and by Gen. McCarthy in "New Directions in US Military Strategy." The newest term being used for strategy foundations is 'critical elements of strategy'. The terms 'strategic principles' and 'strategic concepts' are used interchangeably yet are used to describe the same set of eight points. 'Strategic principles' is used in National

Military Strategy of the United States and 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment. 'Strategic concepts' is used in "New Directions in US Military Strategy."

13 Wickham, White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Division, i.

14 US Army, The US Army Light Infantry Division...Improving Strategic and Tactical Flexibility (Washington, DC.: Department of the Army; circa 1984), p. 4. This booklet, undated, contains the briefing slide and summary of text used to brief the Army's position on light infantry both within and outside of DOD.

15 *Ibid.*, 4.

16 *Ibid.*, 10.

17 *Ibid.*, 6-7.

18 *Ibid.*, 11-17.

19 Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, Historical Analysis and Projection for Army 2000 (Chevy Chase, MD: Edward N. Luttwak, 1982). TRADOC Contract No. DABT-58-82-C-0055. This work consists of two parts. The first part contains nineteen separate papers mostly dated 1 Mar 83. The second part contains analysis and conclusions; the final draft is dated 15 March 83.

20 Dr. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategic Utility of US Light Divisions. A Systematic Evaluation (Chevy Chase, MD: Edward N. Luttwak, 1 August 1985). TRADOC Contract No. DABT-60-84-C-0099.

21 MAJ Richard R. Babbitt, USA, "The Light Infantry Division-How Many Are Needed?," Master of Military Arts and Science (MMAS) Thesis (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1985). A review of these many articles is contained in Chapter Two "Survey of Literature" .

22 COL Dale K. Brudvig, USA, "The Division May Be "Light" But Can It Fight?," Army Times 45 (10 September 84): 65.

23 GEN William E. DePuy, USA Retired, "The Light Infantry Indispensable Element Of a Balanced Force," Army 35 (June 1985), 26-41.

24 LTG John R. Gavin, USA, "Heavy-Light Forces and the NATO Mission," Infantry 75 (July-August 1984): 10-14.

25 CPT(P) David H. Petraeus, USA, "Light Infantry in Europe: Strategic Flexibility and Conventional Deterrence," Military Review LXIV (December 84): 35-55.

26 COL(P) Huba Wass de Czege, USA, Employment Concepts for Light Infantry in Europe: Interim Report (26 August 1988). From an attached FDD,

CACDA Memo dtd 24 Oct. 88, "Background. After brigade command in the 7th ID, Colonel (P) Wass de Czege initiated this study for MG Burba. While mostly a personal project, it has received official recognition and was forwarded through FORSCOM to TRADOC and copies sent to CINCUSAEUR and SACEUR...."

27 Wickham, White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Division, 5.

28 Steven L. Canby, Classic Light Infantry and New Technology (Arlington, VA: C&L Associates, December 82), i.

29 Ibid., i.

30 Ibid., Forward.

31 John Alan English, A Perspective On Infantry (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981).

32 MAJ Scott R. McMichael, USA, A Historical Perspective On Light Infantry (Ft Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Combat Studies Institute (CSI) Research Survey No. 6, September 1987).

33 Wickham, White Paper 1984 Light Infantry Division.

34 The seven divisions referred to here are the Active Component 6th Inf. Div. (LT), 7th Inf. Div. (LT), 10th Mountain Div. (LT), 25th Inf Div (LT), 82d Airborne Div., and 101st Air Assault Div.; and the Reserve component 29th Inf. Div. (LT). The 7th, 25th, and 29th were converted. The 6th and 10th were built. The 82d and 101st were modeled on the new LID design.

35 GEN John A. Wickham, Jr., CSA, as paraphrased by Bernard Adelsberger in "New rules, new roles for "decade of disorder"? Army Times 25 (18 January 1993):6.

36 President George Bush, "Transforming the US Security Environment," The Aspen Institute Quarterly 2 (Autumn 1990), 11-18. This speech can also be found in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Vol. 26., Number 31, 6 August 1990, pp. 1190-1194.

37 GEN Carl E. Vuono, CSA, "National Strategy and the Army of the 1990's," Parameters Vol. XXI, No 2 (Summer 1991): 12.

38 National Security Strategy of the United States, with Preface by President George Bush, (The White House: Govt. Printing Office, August 1991), 25-31.

39 National Security Strategy of the United States, with Preface by President George Bush, (The White House: Govt. Printing Office, January 1993), 13-20.

⁴⁰ GEN James P. McCarthy, USAF, "New Directions in US Military Strategy," Parameters Vol. XXII, No 1 (Spring 1992): 2-10.

⁴¹ Department of Defense, National Military Strategy of the United States with introduction by General Colin L. Powell, CJCS (Washington, DC.: Govt. Printing Office, January 1992), 6-10.

⁴² General Carl E. Vuono, CSA, "National Strategy and the Army of the 1990's," Parameters Vol. XXI, No 2 (Summer 1991): 12.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁴ GEN Carl E. Vuono, CSA, "Desert Storm and the Future of Conventional Forces," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991): 49-68.

⁴⁵ GEN Gordon R. Sullivan, US Army Chief of Staff and the Honorable M.P.W. Stone, Secretary of the Army, "Strategic Force, Strategic Vision For the 1990s and Beyond," A Statement on the posture of the United States Army FY93 presented to the Second Session, 102nd Congress. p. 12.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁴⁷ William Matthews, "Making Do with Les (Aspin)," and "Defense nominee favors leaner, faster Base Force," Army Times (4 January 1993), 3.

⁴⁸ Department of the Army and the Air Force, Field Manual 100-20 and Air Force Pamphlet 3-20, Military Operations In Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC.: US Department of the Army and Air Force, 5 December 1990), 1-1.

⁴⁹ LTC Edward E. Thurman, USA, "Shaping an Army for Peace, Crisis, and War," Military Review (April 1992), 27-35.

⁵⁰ LTC William A. McGrew, LTC Glen R. Sachtleben, MAJ Philip H. Greasley, and MAJ Richard W. Whitney, CLIC Papers--The LIC Planner's Guide (LPG) (Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, VA; March 1992), 1-1 through 1-2.

⁵¹ COL Terry L. Rice, "Forging Security Through Peace," Military Review (April 1991): 26.

⁵² LTC William A. McGrew, LTC Glen R. Sachtleben, MAJ Philip H. Greasley, and MAJ Richard W. Whitney, CLIC Papers--The LIC Planner's Guide (LPG) (Army-Air Force Center for Low Intensity Conflict, Langley Air Force Base, VA; March 1992), 1-4 through 1-5.

⁵³ Joseph Antall quoted in "Annual General Debate," UN Chronicle (March 1992), 14.

54 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC.: Govt. Printing Office, August 1991), 13.

55 Bruce Russett and James S. Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order," Foreign Affairs 70 (Spring 1991): 69.

56 Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs 70 (America and the World 1990/91): 26.

57 "The UN Role," Harrisburg, PA Patriot-News, 23 September 1992, sec. A, p. A12.

58 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, DC.: Govt. Printing Office, August 1991), 13.

59 *Ibid.*, 13.

60 "Annual General Debate," UN Chronicle, March 1992, 13.

61 Prime Minister John Major quoted in "UN Security Council Holds First Summit," Facts on File, Vol. 57, No 2672, February 6, 1992, 65.

62 French President Francois Mitterrand paraphrased in "UN Security Council Holds First Summit," Facts on File, Vol. 57, No 2672, Feb. 6, 1992, 65.

63 LTC Cole C. Kingseed, USA, "Peacetime Engagement: Devising the Army's Role," Parameters Vol. XXII No 3 (Autumn 1992): 96-102. Kingseed's article describes the myriad missions to be found below conventional war. Peacetime engagement according to Kingseed is a much more encompassing term than low-intensity conflict (LIC).

64 Todd R. Greentree, The United States and The Politics of Conflict in the Developing World (Washington, DC: US Department of States; October 1990): 13.

65 Department of the Navy, From The Sea (Washington, DC.: No Date), 5.

66 *Ibid.*, 6.

67 *Ibid.*, 7.

68 William Matthews, p. 3.

69 United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Liaison Office with French War College, French Light Forces Report No. 01-84, dated 15 February 1984. This report is an excellent explanation of how the French in the early eighties were attempting to downsize and retain a flexible, rapidly deploying strategic force.

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